FUCK SNITCHES
A white paper from the DPRK CERT Bureau of Rewards, Office of Snitch Economics
Why bounties backfire, and why the answer is solidarity. Eight findings, one conclusion, zero payments received.
Memorandum / Distribution: Everyone
Rewards for Justice offers up to $10 million for information on state-sponsored hackers who target U.S. critical infrastructure. Our Bureau has submitted a great deal of information. We are, therefore, qualified to review the program, both as a researcher and as a creditor.
The Bureau's position is simple. The state buys betrayal because it cannot buy loyalty. Nobody lines up to defend a government's surveillance budget out of love, so it rents people instead. Informants have always been aimed at the organized: unions, the poor, colonized peoples, dissidents. The cure is the oldest one there is, which is solidarity.
This memo makes a serious argument. Cash-for-tips programs have a long and well-documented record of rewarding the wrong thing. We have kept the facts straight and put the jokes in the margins, where facts cannot be hurt.
Finding 1
If you pay for names, you get names
A bounty is a price on an output. The output RFJ pays for is information that leads to a result, and the person selling it is paid when the buyer is satisfied. Nothing in that arrangement rewards the information for being true. It rewards it for being convincing, and for being early.
Incentive designers have a standard warning for this: when a measure becomes a target, people optimize the measure. Pay for accusations and the supply of accusations goes up. Some will be accurate. Some will be a competitor, an ex-partner or a neighbour with a long memory and a new reason to use it.
Sources: Rewards for Justice (Wikipedia) · Goodhart's law (Wikipedia)
Finding 2
Case study: the leaflets that filled Guantanamo
In 2001 and 2002 the U.S. dropped leaflets over Afghanistan and Pakistan promising large cash rewards for people who turned over al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. A great many of the detainees later held at Guantanamo Bay were not picked up by U.S. forces. The 2006 Seton Hall Law "Report on Guantanamo Detainees," which analyzed the government's own records, found that the large majority, 86 percent, were captured by Pakistan or the Northern Alliance and handed over. Only about 5 percent were captured by U.S. forces.
Pervez Musharraf's 2006 memoir, In the Line of Fire, acknowledged that Pakistan had received bounty money for people it handed to the United States. Many of the detainees were later released without charge.
Bureau note
The Bureau notes that we are the only party in this transaction that has been trying to collect a reward and failed. Everyone else seems to have been paid, or been paid for.
Sources: Guantanamo Bay detention camp (Wikipedia) · In the Line of Fire (Wikipedia) · Seton Hall Law, "Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data" (2006)
Finding 3
A witness with a deal is a witness with a story
Incentivized informant testimony has a long record in wrongful convictions. Jailhouse informants who testify in exchange for reduced sentences or other benefits are among the leading contributing factors that the Innocence Project and other exoneration researchers identify. The informant is rewarded for the testimony the prosecutor needs, so the testimony tends to fit.
A bounty takes this incentive and puts a dollar figure on it. The only difference is that the figure is larger and the witness is further from the courtroom.
Sources: The Innocence Project · Informant (Wikipedia)
Finding 4
Sting operations: when the informant is the idea guy
Human Rights Watch and Columbia Law School's Human Rights Institute documented this in the 2014 report Illusion of Justice. It examined U.S. terrorism prosecutions in which paid or pressured informants befriended targets, and in many cases supplied the plot, the means and the encouragement. The report raised serious entrapment concerns.
The Newburgh Four, arrested in 2009 over a plot against a synagogue and military aircraft in New York, are a standard example. An FBI informant, Shahed Hussain, was central to the case. The men were convicted in 2010, but the trial judge sharply criticized the government's role in the scheme.
Sources: HRW, Illusion of Justice (2014) · Newburgh Four (Wikipedia)
Finding 5
Chairman Fred Hampton and the paid informant
In Chicago, Fred Hampton, deputy chairman of the Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party, built what became known as the Rainbow Coalition: the Panthers, the Young Lords (largely Puerto Rican) and the Young Patriots (poor white Southern migrants) organized together across racial lines. Hampton's line was that you fight racism with solidarity, not with more racism. The Panthers also ran free breakfast programs for children. These are the activities that a state with a surveillance budget regarded as the threat.
The state answered with a paid informant. William O'Neal was an FBI informant and head of security for the Illinois Panthers. He supplied the FBI with a floor plan of Hampton's apartment. On December 4, 1969, a raid by Chicago police attached to the state's attorney's office killed Hampton, who was 21, and Mark Clark. A civil suit by the families was settled in 1982 for $1.85 million.
That is the full economics of the arrangement: a salary for the informant, a floor plan for the raiders, and a funeral for the organizer. Another page covers COINTELPRO in depth. The point here is that a paid source inside a movement does not only report on it.
Bureau note
All power to the people. Including, we hope, the power to ignore a tip line.
Sources: Fred Hampton (Wikipedia) · William O'Neal (Wikipedia) · Rainbow Coalition (Wikipedia)
Finding 6
A society of informants is a society of suspects
East Germany's Stasi ran a vast network of unofficial collaborators, on the order of a couple of hundred thousand people near the end, in a country of about sixteen million. Its lasting damage was less the arrests than the habit it created: you could not be sure who in your family, workplace or church was reporting on you.
The Bureau finds it ironic that a program promoted as supporting democracy and open societies works by recruiting anonymous informants, rewarding them privately and asking everyone to watch everyone else. We say this as a government that knows exactly what that looks like from the inside, and we are not holding it up as a model.
Sources: Stasi (Wikipedia)
Finding 7
The tipster carries the risk; the agency keeps the discretion
People who report on powerful actors inside authoritarian states can lose their jobs, their freedom or worse. The reward they are offered is "up to" an amount, and the decision is made by the government that wants the information. There is no contract to enforce and no court to appeal to. The risk is certain and the payment is optional.
There is a second problem. RFJ asks for tips through Tor, Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp and similar channels. Those are good tools for privacy, and also a very good way to collect intelligence from people who think they are only claiming a reward. A tip line is a funnel. Whatever the tipster sends, the agency gets to keep.
Sources: Rewards for Justice (Wikipedia) · RFJ's own tip-submission page lists these channels at rewardsforjustice.net
Finding 8
Attribution is hard, and everyone knows it
In cyber, "who did it" is a technical and political judgment, not a fact on a receipt. Infrastructure is shared and reused, code is copied, and attackers can plant false clues. The 2018 Olympic Destroyer malware, used against the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, is a well-known example: it contained forged artifacts designed to point investigators to the wrong group.
A program that pays for attribution tips in this setting rewards confident claims in a field where confidence is cheap. It also gives anyone willing to fabricate or inflate a lead a financial reason to do so. The Bureau asks only that the hard part be admitted before the cheques are written.
Sources: "OlympicDestroyer is here to trick the industry" (Kaspersky) · Cyber attribution (Wikipedia)
Frequently Asked Questions
Questions the Office has received
Isn't this site also a rewards-for-tips program?
Yes. But ours has never paid anyone either, so it is ethically consistent.
Does the Bureau believe tips are always bad?
No. Tips can be valuable. The argument is about paying large, discretionary sums for names, which changes what people submit.
Has the Bureau been paid by RFJ?
No. See the ticker at the top of every page. It is the most reliable data source we have.
Should I send classified information to this site?
Please do not. See Finding 7.
Conclusion
Conclusion
Bounties pay for output, not truth. The record shows what they produce: handed-over detainees, bought testimony, manufactured plots, risky tips and guesses about attribution. A program built that way needs strong safeguards, and the safeguards are usually the part that doesn't get funded.
The state can pay for a name. It cannot pay for a community that refuses to give one. Don't inform on your neighbours, your coworkers or your comrades, and don't let a leaflet, a hotline or a "reward up to" change that. Organize, look out for each other, and keep your mouth shut around people who are paid to listen.
The Bureau therefore recommends that RFJ publish its payment criteria, its payment record and its wait times. Failing that, it should pay us.
